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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins2
has burrowed its way so deeply into our legal culture that one may won-
der whether, dandelion-like, its roots will resist all efforts at disturbance.
But that concern has not stopped a recent wave of scholarship on this
pivotal case. Indeed, so much has grown up around the decision that it is
easy to forget how straightforward it was. As everyone knows, Justice Lou-
is Brandeis, the decision's author, startled the bar by announcing that the
central question in Erie was whether to overrule Swift v. Tyson.! The Court
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Tulane Law School on March
5, 2012, as the McGlinchey Lecture. I am grateful to Tulane for the opportunity to
give that lecture and for the many useful comments on the paper that were offered.
* ChiefJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. I gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of my former law clerk, Tejas Narechania, J.D. Columbia
Law School 2011, in the preparation of the original McGlinchey Lecture.
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 69; Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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went on to hold that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State" -in other words, the default rule for federal courts is state
law. Erie also resolved once and for all that the term "state law" in the
Rules of Decision Act includes both positive enactments and state deci-
sional law.5 These rulings were compelled, the Court said, by the fact that
neither Congress nor the federal courts have the "power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a State."Y
One would think that a simple default rule pointing to state law
would be easy to apply, but experience proved that it was not. Overnight,
the simple Erie idea morphed into the unwieldy "Erie doctrine." In this
paper, I argue that much of the complexity that has encrusted Erie is un-
necessary. What should have been an uncomplicated standard has be-
come bogged down with needless exceptions to exceptions to exceptions,
and in the process the doctrine has drifted away from its animating prin-
ciples. It is time to consider how we might return to first principles by
simplifying the Erie doctrine and remaining true to the federalist struc-
ture that is the foundation of our Constitution.
I. BEFORE ERIE
It is helpful to begin by recalling the legal landscape just before Erie.
By the time 1938 rolled around, Justice Holmes had written his book The
Common Law,' the Legal Realism movement was in full swing, and the
idea that law is a "brooding omnipresence" had become (rightly) derid-
ed." It is against that backdrop that the Erie Court criticized the rule es-
tablished in Sw ias something "rest[ing] upon the assumption that there
is a 'transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obliga-
tory within it."'9 But was that a good description of the views held by the
judges of previous generations, and Justice Story in particular? Perhaps
not.
Such a portrayal is neither necessary to Erie's core holding nor fair to
the pre-Realist judges. It paints them in a needlessly unflattering light,
suggesting that they sat idly in their chambers, seeking guidance from
higher authorities, and plucking principles out of the sky. The judges of
whom the Court spoke, however, would have laughed at such a picture.
The English (and later American) common law those earlierjudges knew
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
Id.; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).
6 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMESJR., THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881).
S. Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
iEe, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
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was a system of traditional law, wherein each new question was decided
by applying or extending the rules that had been established in earlier
cases. This familiar system of precedential lawmaking was a far cry from
a legal Ouija Board.
As early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, courts in medieval
England, "guided by [their] own customs had no difficulty in accommo-
dating to new conditions, and if an adjustment seemed desirable [the
court] might expressly announce what it proposed to do in the future.""
This view persisted over the next several centuries. In 1528, Christopher
St. Germain, a sixteenth-century barrister who debated Sir Thomas More
on important religious questions, sought to mediate the divide between
doctors of divinity and students of common law. In his famous pamphlet
Doctor and Student, Germain concluded that of the six pillars of English
law, the "law of reason" is the primary one. 2 That law, he said, could be
broken down into two components. "Primary reason," the first, included
such affirmative pronouncements as the prohibitions on murder and de-
ceit, while "secondary reason" arose out of general customs and the max-
ims of the realm.
The conception of the common law as an incremental and custom-
ary body of doctrine was further sharpened in the early seventeenth cen-
tury. Lord Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke, who famously clashed with
King James I on several occasions, argued in 1607 that the King was not
qualified to decide legal cases. 4 Coke conceded that "God had endowed
His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature."" In
his view, however, this divinely inspired knowledge was not enough:
[H]is Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England,
and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or for-
tunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by
the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which
requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to
the cognisance of it.'
'0 SeeJOSEPH STORY, CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW (1837), reprinted in THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OFJOSEPH STORY 701-02 (William W. Story ed., Charles C.
Little andJames Brown, Boston 1852).
S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 25 (2003).
2 CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 12 (William Muchall ed.,
Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1874) (1518).
" J.W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAw MIND 72-73 (2000) (discussing ST. GERMAIN,
supra note 12).
" SeeJerome E. Bickenbach, The 'Artificial Reason' of the Law, 12 INFORMAL LOGIC
23, 23 (1990).
" Id. (quoting Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B.), 12 Co.
Rep. 64) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. (quoting Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343, 12 Co. Rep. 64)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Thus Coke, in defining the common law, emphasized the "activity of
the judges in constantly refining the law."" Thomas Hedley, in a notable
speech to the House of Commons, offered a similar description of the
nature of common law.'8 He saw the common law as reason approved by
the judges to be good and profitable for the commonwealth. The only
test by which the common law could be judged, he thought, was "time,
which is the trier of truth, author of all human wisdom, learning and
knowledge, and from [which] all human laws receive their chiefest
strength, honor, and estimation. Time is wiser than the judges, wiser than
the parliament, [nay] wiser than the wit of man." 0 John Selden, a par-
liamentarian in the House of Commons, held a similar view. To him,
and many of his contemporaries ... the common law ha[d] been in
constant evolution over the centuries, but they do not attach that
belief to the notion of immemoriality. In view of the evidence-that
many prominent common lawyers of the period recognize that the
common law has undergone substantial change over the centu-
ries-it is inaccurate to define the common law mind in terms of a
belief in the unchanged, immemorial antiquity of the common
law.2 1
Jumping ahead to nineteenth-century America, what stands out is
the lack of any significant change in this long-held view of the common
law as a customary system that evolves using the building blocks of expe-
rience. The author of Swift v. Tyson himself, responding to a proposal to
codify the common law of Massachusetts, expressed views that are con-
sistent with this understanding. He wrote:
[T]he common law consists of positive rules and remedies, of gen-
eral usages and customs, and of elementary principles, and the de-
velopments or applications of them, which cannot now be distinctly
traced back to any statutory enactments, but which rest for their au-
thority upon the common recognition, consent and use of the State
itself 2
Continuing, Justice Story recognized that:
In truth, the common law is not in its nature and character an abso-
lutely fixed, inflexible system .... It is rather a system of elementary
principles and of general juridical truths, which are continually ex-
panding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves to
17 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A REISSUE WITH A
RETROSPECT 35 (2d ed. 1987).
1 TUBBS, supra note 13, at 149.
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN 1610 72-73 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed.,
LondonJohn Bowyer Nichols & Sons 1862).
" 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1610: HOUSE OF COMMONS 175 (Elizabeth Read
Foster, ed., 1966); seeTuBBs, supra note 13, at 150.
2 TUBBS, supra note 13, at 147.
22 STORY, supra note 10, at 701.
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the gradual changes of trade, and commerce, and the mechanic
arts, and the exigencies and usages of the country.
This vision of the common law persists today. In writing about the
role of the common law, Judge Richard Posner has suggested that
"[e]fficiency... should be influential in judicial decision-making when
judges are called upon to exercise a legislative function."2 4 Furthermore,
he argues, when a later case is based on the original efficiency-promoting
decision, it is more likely also to be efficiency-enhancing.5 Thus, whether
the guiding principle underlying the development of the common law is
efficiency, historical fidelity, or something else, the process itself is the
same cautious and incremental decision-making.
It is against this backdrop-not Justice Holmes's unflattering charac-
terization of pre-Realist thought-that we should consider the decision in
Swift v. Tyson. In Swift, Justice Story needed to define the phrase "the
laws" in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (now known as the Rules
of Decision Act).1 He concluded that "[t]he laws of a state are more usu-
ally understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the
legislative authority" because "the decisions of Courts .. . are, at most, on-
ly evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws."" That is
because they "are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the
Courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-
founded, or otherwise incorrect."2 9 When, 96 years later, Justice Brandeis
described the "fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson" as
"rest[ing] upon the assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State"'3 0 he was putting words into Justice
Story's mouth. Brandeis's depiction failed to give credit to Story's under-
standing of the common law as a system of customary law that grows in-
crementally-one could say empirically-and that later cases often re-
examine, qualify, or abandon.' Serious adherents of Natural Law would
admit of no such transience in its principles.
In 1842, when Swift appeared, deciding what substantive rule of deci-
sion should apply was not the only difficulty facing the federal courts.
Rules of procedure also began to confound legal practice in the federal
courts. Although those courts bad always been free to create their own
21 Id. at 701-02.
2' RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 132 (1995).
2 See id.
2' 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2' Now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
28 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
29 id.
" Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
' STORY, supra note 10, at 701-02.
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12procedures for proceedings in equity and had done so since 1822, they
were initially required in actions at law to apply the procedural rules of
the forum state as of the time that state joined the Union. As the nation
grew and states undertook ambitious procedural reforms, the rules of
procedure in federal court diverged sharply from those applied in the
state courts. In response, Congress passed the Conformity Act of 1872.
Section 5 of the Conformity Act provided that, except for federal rules of
evidence (and the rules of privilege in particular):
[T]he practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in
other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district
courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at
the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State.34
Section 6 similarly provided:
That in common-law causes in the circuit and district courts of the
United States the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies, by
attachment or other process against the property of the defendant,
which are now provided for by the laws of the State in which such
court is held, applicable to the court of such State.
To summarize the situation before Erie, therefore, there were signifi-
cant differences between the federal courts and the state courts, from a
procedural standpoint in equity cases and from a substantive standpoint
to the extent that the evolving common-law doctrines followed by the
federal courts diverged from those used in the legal systems of the several
states. Whether this created-either sometimes or always-an issue of
constitutional dimension is debatable. The Erie Court thought so, at least
for cases based on the diversity jurisdiction. So let us turn to Erie now
and see what it actually held, and then we will move on to its elaboration.
II. THE DECISION IN ERIE
The 1930s brought momentous change not only for society as a
whole through the adoption of the New Deal, but also for the U.S. legal
system, and in particular for the niche occupied by the federal courts. In
1934, Congress launched comprehensive judicial reform with the passage
" Process Act of 1792, ch. 36 § 1, 1 Stat. 275. The first procedural niles for actions in
equity were promulgated in 1822. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S.,
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, v-xiii (1822). Interestingly, it seems likely that these first rules were
drafted by Justice Story. Kristin A. Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation": Article III,
Equity, and judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 249, 273 (2010).
Conformity Act, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
* Id. § 5.
3 Id. § 6.
" See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) ("But the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us
to [overrule Swift].").
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of the Rules Enabling Act. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
developed under that law took effect, and almost at the same time, the
Supreme Court counterpunched with Erie. These developments deserve a
close look.
A. The Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Although the Conformity Act modernized practice and procedure in
381the federal courts, it was not able to spare those courts from the same
problems that the states were experiencing. Around the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the various state procedural codes, most of which derived
from New York's Field Code,3 began to receive increasingly negative re-
views.40 The codes were "criticized ... for being unnecessarily rigid and
elaborate," and because the codes were legislative rather than court-
promulgated, amendment was difficult. Some critics were skeptical of
the legislatures' ability ever to develop efficient procedural rules, charg-
ing that they were "'the catspaw of a few intriguing lawyers' who sought
only 'to serve selfish ends.'"4
After much debate and the interruption of the Great Depression,
Congress finally resolved this procedural puzzle in 1934 by enacting the
43Rules Enabling Act, which launched an effort to craft a new set of pro-
cedural rules for the federal courts. In 1937, the drafters' work was com-
plete4 4 and Supreme Court resolved, as expressed in the new Rule 2, that
there would be "one form of action-the civil action,"5 and that the cen-
turies-old divide between law and equity would be abolished. The Court
also decided that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would take ef-
41fect one year later, in 1938. In that year, Erie was decided.
7 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)); see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1003 at 22 n.11 (3d ed. 2002).
* Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) ("The purpose of the [Conformity Act of
1875] is apparent upon its face. No analysis is necessary to reach it. It was to bring about
uniformity in the law of procedure in the Federal and State courts of the same locality.").
" See Thomas A. Shaw, Jr., Procedural Reform and the Rule-Making Power in New York,
24 FORDHAM L. REV. 338, 338-39 (1955) ("Field's code was adopted by some thirty
American jurisdictions and profoundly influenced the English practice provisions
adopted in the Supreme Court ofJudicature Act of 1875. . . .").
" See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION
28 (2000).
41 Id.
Id. at 29 (quoting John H. Wigmore, Editorial Note, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278 (1928).
" Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
44 PURCELL, supra note 40, at 135.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
46 See PURCELL, supra note 40, at 29.
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B. The Decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins
Erie has been described as the rare "decision of the Supreme Court
that embodied the well-considered and fundamental constitutional theo-
ry of only a single justice."" Justice Brandeis was a strong opponent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' He was the only Justice to dissent from
their approval.4 9 He did so because he viewed the rules as overreaching
and rigid; worse, he saw them as yet another example, like the National
Industrial Recovery Act, of the needless centralization of authority.o
Brandeis saw in Erie the opportunity to overrule Swift and counterbalance
the new Civil Rules by decentralizing substantive-rather than procedural-
decision-making authority.,
In writing his opinion, as I already have noted, Justice Brandeis
adopted Justice Holmes's criticism of Swift v. Tyson as resting on the
faulty assumption that all pre-Realist judges viewed common law-making
as the adoption of "a transcendental body of law."5 2 Even if we disregard
the problems already reviewed with this account, there can be no doubt
that Erie was designed to, and did, clear up much of the confusion that
the Swift rule had caused. By 1938, Brandeis wrote, "the mischievous re-
sults of the doctrine had become apparent."5 He was not alone in this
viewpoint. Charles Warren (among others) sharply criticized Swift, noting
that "no decision of the Court has ever given rise to more uncertainty."
"[I]nstead of preventing a discrimination against a non-citizen," Warren
argued, "[Swift's rule] results in discrimination in their favor and against
the citizen; and instead of making one law for all in a State, [it] makes
different law for citizen and non-citizen." In other words, one cannot
have it both ways: the system can either maximize harmony across all fed-
eral courts in the country, or it can maximize harmony between the fed-
eral and state courts within one state, but it cannot do both. The only
question on the table is which option to select. Critics in the 1930s were
troubled that Swift's rule introduced uncertainty over legal rules and ob-
ligations at a time when interstate commerce was growing rapidly. 56 And,
as Justice Brandeis pointed out in Erie,7 there were egregious examples
Id. at 114.
* Id. at 135.
49 Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
52 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting))(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 74.
2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY 88-89
(1937).
5 Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REv. 49, 85 (1923) (emphasis omitted).
5 E.g., WARREN, supra note 54, at 89.
" SeeErie, 304 U.S. at 73 & n.6.
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of abusive forum shopping, such as the one found in Black & White Taxi-
cab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, where a corporation was allowed to create
diversity jurisdiction by the simple expedient of dissolving itself in one
state and re-forming in another before suing.5
Determined to sort out the confusion wrought by Swift, Justice
Brandeis took the debate up a notch when he suggested that there was
actually a constitutional problem with the ancien rigime." The law, he said,
"does not exist without some definite authority behind it."o For cases
brought under state causes of actions, that authority derives from the
State.6 ' Justice Brandeis observed that what Swift actually had done was to
convert a grant of jurisdiction-diversit6V jurisdiction-into a license for
judges to exercise lawmaking authority. Noting the absence of any other
provision in the Constitution granting power to the federal government
to legislate in the traditional common-law areas, he concluded that the
inference from jurisdiction to law-making competence was "an unconsti-
tutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States."3
C. What Erie Said
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to discern at least two
central features of the Erie decision. First, as Justice Reed's concurrence
highlights, the decision presupposed a sharp line between the substantive
rules of decision and the authority of the Court to adopt its own rules of
procedure. Justice Reed thus foresaw the question whether Erie might
restrict the scope of the authority the Court had just received from the
Rules Enabling Act, and in so doing, call into question some or all of the
Federal Civil Rules. Second, on questions of substance, the Erie Court set
the default to the state rule of decision.65 Only if the Constitution or an
Act of Congress dictated otherwise-and these are of course both positive
sources of federal law-would state law yield. 6 If matters had stayed here,
then the Erie rule would have been straightforward. But they did not, and
the results have spawned a new set of problems.
276 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1928).
* See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
m Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 553 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See id.
62 See id. at 71-72.
6 Id. at 78-79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 553 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See id. at 91-92 (Reed,J., concurring).
Id. at 78 (majority opinion).
* Id.
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III. AFTER ERE-THE "DOCTRINE"
Cases since Erie have touched on at least three major questions. First
is the question familiar to all Civil Procedure students: How does one
"sort" cases into those in which state law applies, and those in which the
federal rule (a term that has been used broadly) applies? Second, if state
law applies, how does a federal court determine the content of that law?
For the purposes of this paper, that question (vexing as it can be) can be
set aside. Lastly, and of greatest interest, is the third: If we have decided
that federal law governs, when and how should federal courts fashion a
rule? Federalism concerns run through all three of these questions: How
can the federal judiciary reconcile its independent authority as part of a
separate sovereign with Erie's proclamation that the default rule is that
state law provides the rules of decision?
A. Defining the Sorting Function
1. Early Cases and the Development of "Outcome Determination"
The first set of cases decided in the years immediately following Erie
attempted to clarify the line between substance and procedure. The
Court found a little of both. For example, in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dun-
lap, it ruled that the burden of proof "relate [d] to a substantial right" and
was thus a question of substantive law on which the federal courts were
obliged to follow state rules of decision.6 Four years later, in Palmer v.
Hoffman, the Court expanded on this ruling, explaining that although
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires a defendant to plead con-
tributory negligence as an affirmative defense, whether such negligence
has been established at trial is to be determined under the governing
state-law standard, including state rules dictating which party bears the
burden of proof on that point." In other words, the pleadings are gov-
erned by federal rules, but the substantive trial standard is provided by
the state. Similarly, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., the
Court found that there was no "'general law' of conflict of laws," and that
federal courts thus had to apply the forum state's choice of law rules." As
it said, a state has a sovereign "right to pursue local policies diverging
from those of its neighbors."
But the Court did not always opt for state law. In Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., it ruled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 did not implicate the
substantial privacy rights of a liti ant when it subjected her to a required
physical or mental examination. It therefore held that the federal pro-
67 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939).
318 U.S. 109,116-17 (1943).
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
70 Id.
7 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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cedural rule prevailed over a contrary state rule in the forum state. In so
ruling, the Court unhelpfully said that in order to determine whether a
civil rule was valid under the Rules Enabling Act, and thus applicable in
federal court under Erie, "[t]he test must be whether a rule really regu-
lates procedure." The importance of the right, it thought, was too vague
to serve as a useful metric.
Not surprisingly, the question immediately arose how to decide
whether a rule "really" regulates procedure. The Court's first stab at
elaboration came in Guaranty Trust v. York.x There, it took another look
at the purpose of the decision in Erie, noting that Erie overruled Swift be-
cause the latter case had rested on the mistaken idea "that there was 'a
transcendental body of law"' and because Swift's rule had led to aggres-
sive forum shopping.76 Focusing on the second point, Guaranty Trust con-
cluded that state law should apply whenever application of a contrary
rule would "significantly affect the result of a litigation."" Applied to the
facts of the case, the Court ruled that state statutes of limitations were
"substantive" and thus applicable in federal court. 8 This, the Court
hoped, would "insure that ... the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State
court."' This came to be called the "outcome-determination" test.so
The Guaranty Trust test was, to put it kindly, seriously incomplete.
The Court recognized this in time, although it has never completely laid
this test to rest. More than 40 years after Guaranty Trust, in Felder v. Casey,
the Court was looking into the question whether a state notice-of-claim
statute had to be used in a federal civil rights case that is being adjudicat-
ed in state court.m It conceded that states were generally free to impose
their own rules of procedure, but it ruled that they may not unduly bur-
den federal rights by applying procedural requirements that have an
"outcome-determinative" impact on the federal cause of action. It there-
fore found that the state law was preempted because it was inconsistent
with federal law."
" Id. at 13-14.
3 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
7 See id.
7 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
76 Id. at 101-03, 111-12 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
1 Id. at 109.
Id. at 109-12.
Id. at 109.
8o See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1965).
"8 487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988).
82 Id. at 151.
" Id. at 134.
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2. Byrd, Hanna, and "Arguably Procedural"
Although the Court has continued to invoke the idea of outcome de-
termination when faced with state courts adjudicating federal rights-the
so-called reverse-Erie line of cases -it quickly rejected this test for feder-
al courts sitting in diversity, for the obvious reason that almost any proce-
dural glitch could determine the outcome of litigation. The test thus
failed at its one and only job: to separate cases (or issues) for which fed-
eral law should apply from those that should use a state rule of decision.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the Court, applying Guaranty
Trust, ruled that the enforceability of a contract provision mandating ar-
bitration would depend on state law rather than the Federal Arbitration
Act. The Court stated that "[t]he nature of the tribunal where suits are
tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of ac-
tion."" Reflecting on the nature of arbitration, the Court concluded that
such a proceeding differed vastly from a traditional courtroom trial.
Thus, because "the outcome of litigation mi ht depend on the court-
house where suit is brought," state law applied.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., decided only two years
later, marked a significant departure from the course set out in Guaranty
Trust and Bernhardt.89 Byrd highlighted the crucial defect in the outcome-
determination rule: It failed to account adequately for the federal judici-
ary's independent authority over its own procedural priorities.90 (Put dif-
ferently, the Guaranty Trust approach failed to give sufficient weight to
the fact that Article III expressly contemplates an independent federal
court system, and thus by implication it also recognizes that courts must
be able to organize themselves.) 1 Byrd presented the question whether a
case brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction should be tried
by ajury (as is required by federal law) or by ajudge (as was required by
the state under the governing standard) . Declining to decide the case
on straightforward Seventh Amendment grounds,9 ' the Court likened the
effect of a ury trial to the choice of alternative forum it had addressed in
Bernhardt. Although the Court conceded the possibility that "the out-
come would be substantially affected by whether the issue . . . is decided
" See, e.g.,Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997); Felder, 487 U.S. at 138.
' 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
8 Id.
87 Id.
" Id.
356 U.S. 525, 539-40 (1958).
* Id. at 536-37.
8 See id. at 537.
9 Id. at 526, 533-35.
'3 See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam) (holding the
Seventh Amendment applies in diversity jurisdiction cases).
" Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
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by a judge or a jury," this was not enough to resolve the case.9" Instead,
the Court decided that it had to balance "the federal policy favoring jury
decisions" against both the "state rule" and the interest in maintaining
consistency of result between the federal and state forum. In a some-
what surprising decision, the Court concluded that the federal policy in
favor of jury trials had to prevail, because the concern for state policies
"could not disrupt or alter the essential character or function of a federal
court.
It seems unlikely that after Byrd, Bernhardt would come out the same
way. The Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act reflects an important legislative determination over the
scope of the judiciary's authority." Forcing a federal court to hear a case
that would otherwise be directed to arbitration could elevate a state poli-
cy over an essential congressional limitation on the court's jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industry Loan Corp.-another pre-Byrd
case-the Court required the use of a New Jersey statute holding an un-
successful shareholder-plaintiff liable for the defendants' attorneys'
fees.99 After Byrd, it is not so clear that the Court would have ruled the
same way, given the importance of the American Rule for attorneys'
fees. 1 0
These thought experiments aside, the Court completed in Hanna v.
Plumedo' what it had started in the Byrd. Deciding whether the standard
for the adequacy of service of process was to be set by federal or state
rules, the district court in Hanna ruled that state law applied, citing to
Guaranty Trust and Ragan.'o2 The Supreme Court reversed, expressly re-
pudiating the " [o]utcome-determination" inquiry from Guaranty Trust in
this context.10 3 It supplanted that standard with a test that sorted cases by
whether the federal rule at issue governs a matter that is, in the words of
Justice Harlan, "arguably procedural.,1 4 In so doing, it underscored the
idea that there are certain irreducible powers that go along with the insti-
tution of a court.
* Id.
9 Id. at 538.
* Id. at 539.
" See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012)
(per curiam).
9 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949).
'0 See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rellndus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-
30 (1974).
101 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
0o Id. at 461-62. See Ragan v. Merch. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949); Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1'0 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, 466-67.
104 Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed,J., concurring).
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In Hanna, the Court balanced Erie's stated policy of guarding against
unconstitutional assumptions of power byjudiciary'0 against the Consti-
tution's explicit "grant of power over federal procedure," ruling that
wherever there is a direct conflict between state law and a relevant Feder-
al Rule of Civil Procedure, the federal rule should apply.'06 The Hanna
modification has the practical effect of reversing Eie's presumption in
favor of state rules of decision, at least for anything covered by a federal
rule and that falls in the gray area between substance and procedure.
3. The Gasperini Puzzle
Finallr, there is the unusual decision in Gasperini v. Center for Human-
ities, Inc.1o Gasperini involved the applicability of a New York remittitur
statute that contained both procedural and substantive elements: it was
substantive in its standard for assessing excessiveness of a verdict (and
thus whether remittitur was necessary); but it was procedural insofar as it
assigned decision-making authority to the state's appellate division rather
than the trial court."o The Supreme Court found that this structure was
"out of sync with the federal system's division of trial and appellate court
functions, an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment."'" The
Court had in mind the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amend-
ment, which severely limits the role of appellate courts in reviewing jury
verdicts."o Rather than say, as it did in Byrd, that the allocation of func-
tions between judge and jury, or for that matter between trial and appel-
late courts, is something that inevitably goes along with the choice of a
court system,11 the Court strained to find a middle ground. It came up
with a Rube Goldberg-like rule under which, in a case in federal court,
New York's substantive interest in controlling excessive verdicts would be
handled by the federal trial court, while the federal court of appeals
would be permitted to review the lower court's decision, but only for
abuse of discretion."' It did so over the dissents of four Justices, who
found neither authority nor reason to craft this hybrid structure.'
The Court reached a result that bent over backwards to implement
the state's policy. It did so, however, at the price of complicating the sort-
ing inquiry. Putting to one side the substantive standard for remittitur,
the New York statute in Gasperini was nothing more or less than a jury
control device. Byrd makes clear that the federal courts are entitled to di-
vide responsibilities between judge and jury their own way."4 The Seventh
'o'Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
106 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74.
1o7 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
." Id. at 426.
l" Id.
10 Id. at 432-34.
.. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
112 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437-38.
.. Id. at 447-48 (Stevens,J., dissenting); id. at 448-58 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
"1 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
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Amendment applies to cases brought in federal court under diversity ju-
risdiction,"5 and Hanna establishes that the federal rules apply whenever
the matter at issue is arguably procedural.' 16 Whether or not some facet
of litigation represents an "essential characteristic" of the federal judici-
ary is beside the point. Hanna's "arguably procedural" test represents the
Court's balancing of the interests embodied in Erie and the Rules of De-
cision Act aainst the Constitution's explicit "grant of power over federal
procedure." ' The New York policy was procedural, and so it should have
given way to the mechanisms provided by federal law for the control of
excessive verdicts.
B. Fashioning Federal-Common-Law Rules ofDecision
Even if the court decides that federal law will displace the competing
state rule, its troubles are not over. At that point, the federal court is
faced with the task of giving content to the applicable rule-in other
words, how exactly does the court create and apply federal rules of deci-
sion.
Before turning squarely to this problem, we must return briefly to
the problem of sorting. Hanna appears to give federal courts a compre-
hensive rule for when to apply state law and when to apply federal law.
But it does not. There is at least one class of cases for which the Court has
grafted an exception onto Hanna's rule: Even where a case presents an
unambiguously substantive question and is not a federal-question matter
(and thus one might think is controlled by state law), the Court will apply
federal law even in the absence of any governing statute or constitutional
provision if the litigation implicates "uniquely federal interests."" This
means, as a practical matter, that federal common law may be created in
these areas. The Supreme Court has described these cases as those "nar-
row areas [that are] ... concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the con-
flicting rihts of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiral-
ty cases.
This special class of cases for which federal common law may permis-
sibly be crafted seems to come from out of the blue, yet it has wide sup-
port on the Court. By defining such large classes of cases for the domain
of federal law, the Court has stretched Hanna's reversal of Erie's pre-
sumption in favor of state law considerably. This set of cases often pre-
sents special problems when the Court then tries to give content to that
federal rule. By hypothesis, there is no federal statute that applies direct-
"' Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432.
"' Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan,J., concurring).
Id. at 474 (majority opinion).
"' See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
"" Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (citation
omitted).
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ly; if there were, then the question would not arise. What is a court (ei-
ther federal or state) to do in such a case? A few examples of "uniquely
federal interests" illustrate how the problem is being approached now.
1. United States as a Party
The first group of cases that have presented "uniquely federal inter-
ests" are those that involve the "obligations to and rights of the United
States."o2 0 In these cases, the courts have understood their task to be to
fashion federal rules of decision. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, which
involved commercial paper, inaugurated this line. 2 ' In determining
whether state or federal law applied to the question of whether notice of
a forgery had been unduly delayed, the Court found Erie's rule inappli-
cable. 2 2 It did so because, it said, "[t]he authority to issue the check had
its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and
was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other
state."'2 By process of elimination (and in notable contrast to Erie's as-
sumed default rule in favor of state law) the Court reasoned that "[t]he
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a
result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources."12 4 The
idea seems to have been that the federal government's constitutional au-
thority to act in the open market gives it the authority to create a set of
special rules that apply only to the United States.
In giving content to the federal rule applicable in Clearfield Trust, the
Court mentioned a common, but rather convoluted, practice in which it
engages: "[i]n ... [choosing] the applicable federal rule we have occa-
sionally selected state law."' 2 ' That practice at least leads back to state law
in the end, albeit with a federal detour. But the Court did not adopt that
approach in Clearfield. It held instead that the "vast scale" of the United
States' participation across the "several states" indicated that "[Lt]he ap-
plication of state law. . . would subject the rights and duties of the United
States to exceptional uncertainty."'2 6 Astonishingly, the Court expressly
resurrected Swift v. Tyson "as a convenient source of reference for fash-
ioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions" and created a
specially applicable rule.'
Since Clearfield, in cases where the Court has concluded that federal
law applies, it has usually wended its way back to state law through the
borrowing device. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., for example, it first
relied on Clearfield to determine that "the priority of liens stemming from
120 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
12' 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 id.
"5 Id. at 367.
12 Id.
127 id.
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federal lending programs must be determined with reference to federal
law," even absent a federal statute that explicitly set such priorities.12 But
then, faced with the job of giving content to this "federal rule," the Court
decided to "reject generalized pleas for uniformity" and to turn instead
to state laws.1 9 It is hard to understand what is being accomplished by the
borrowing device. It certainly finds no support in Erie.'" By any other
name, it is still the creation of general common law for the subset of cases
in which the United States is participating in private markets. But if fed-
eral common law is proper for this group, then in what other areas
should it be used? Even if a court could spot a uniquely federal interest,
how is it to determine whether that interest is so substantial as to warrant
the creation of federal common law-whether a special, tailor-made rule
as in Clearfield, or a borrowed rule, as in Kimbell Foods? Had the Supreme
Court chosen to stick with the original formulation in Erie, this problem
would not arise. Instead, state law would apply, unless and until Congress
decided that federal legislation was necessary.
Even if one grants for the sake of argument that special considera-
tions might justify a unique set of common-law rules for cases in which
the United States is a party, the Court's more recent cases have strayed
beyond these limits. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Court found
that federal law applies under the "uniquely federal interests" exception
not because the case "involve [d] an obligation to the United States under
its contract" but because of the "'uniquely federal' interest ... [in] civil
liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement con-
tracts.",1' The government's interest in the performance of its procure-
ment contracts, the Court announced, justified the creation of a separate
set of federal-common-law rules for its contractors.132
Boyle's assessment of uniquely federal interests is hard to reconcile
with other post-Erie cases. In Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, the Su-
preme Court held that its ruling in Klaxon-that choice-of-law rules are
substantive state law principles that apply in diversity cases-applied to a
case brought by a military service member against the manufacturer of a
defective artillery round. 1 Although Challoner might be set aside as pre-
senting a narrow question on choice-of-law rules, its factual background
acknowledges that "the Federal Government's interest in the procure-
ment of equipment is implicated .
In the end, the existence of a set of free-floating federal-common-law
rules that apply when the United States is a party to litigation seems con-
trary to the Court's rationale in Erie. Apart from Article III's grant of ju-
440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979).
Id. at 727, 730.
30 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
487 U.S. 500, 504-06 (1988).
132 Id.
3 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam).
' Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506.
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risdiction to the federal courts in "Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party," there seems to be no justification for the crea-
tion of federal common law that is specially applicable to the federal gov-
ernment (and its contractors). Instead, in cases involving the United
States (for which, incidentally, no one questions the power of Congress
to enact appropriate legislation), the substantive rule of decision should
come from the same positive law that provides the cause of action.
2. AdmiraltyJurisdiction
In addition to cases in which the United States is a party, there is also
a long tradition of developing federal common law for suits brought un-
der the federal judiciary's maritime jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that, in large part, "IJa]dmiralty law is judge-made
law.""' Most recently, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court took the
lead in developing a special rule for punitive damages in maritime law. 3 1
This was an area, it said, "which falls within a federal court's jurisdiction
to decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authorit
of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result."1
The Court felt free to reach far back into the common law-citing even
to the Code of Hammurabi-to arrive at the uncontroversial proposition
that punitive damages "are aimed not at com Rensation but principally at
retribution and deterring harmful conduct."' After an extensive canvass
of state and federal mechanisms for controlling excessive punitive dam-
ages, the Court created its own common law rule: "a 1:1 ratio ... is a fair
upper limit in such maritime cases.,"o
Where does this authority to develop common law for maritime cases
come from? The Court provided a direct answer to this question in Nor-
folk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby: "Our authority to make decisional law
for the interpretation of maritime contracts stems from the Constitu-
tion's grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts.""' That is, accord-
ing to the case law, the federal courts' constitutional authority to entertain
maritime cases gives it the authority to create rules that govern those cases.
But why, if this is so, is the grant of diversity jurisdiction different?
Why in particular does it not carry with it the power to create rules? Erie
thought it clear that any effort to assert that additional power would raise
serious constitutional questions. One answer might lie in Erie's observa-
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
' Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantiqiue, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
' 554 U.S. 471, 501-14 (2008).
.. Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 491-92.
40 Id. at 513.
.' 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004) (emphasis added).
'2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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tion that law "does not exist without some definite authority behind it." 4 3
In diversity cases, Erie said that this authority is state authority,'4 4 but that
assertion does not explain why this should be so. Just as the Court has
seen powerful reasons for a uniform, nationally binding law of admiralty,
one could make an argument for a uniform, nationally binding law for
disputes between citizens of different states. (Indeed, Justice Story be-
lieved that such an argument was compelling.) '
Article III extends the judicial power to federal courts in "all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.",4 6 In order for the federal courts to
have the authority to create common-law rules in admiralty, this constitu-
tional provision must be the "definite authority" that supports such law-
making authority. Indeed, some of the staunchest defenders of the
Court's authority to make maritime common law have admitted as
much.'4 1 Professor Monaghan has suggested that this justification for the
authority to make maritime law would essentially convert the Court's
maritime jurisprudence into a narrow branch of constitutional interpre-
tation. But, under this view, the Court's repeated pronouncements that
its maritime rulings can be displaced by statute 49 could not be squared
with Marbury v. Madison.5 0 In the end, it is harder than one might think
to explain why the grant of maritime jurisdiction in Article III should be
interpreted broadly as a grant of federal law-making power.
If Article III does not provide the "definite authority" that supports
the courts' law-making power in admiralty, what does? It is hard to find
anything, if one is both consistent and a purist about the scope of Article
III. Erie says that the conversion of a jurisdictional grant into law-making
power is "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of the
United States."' Read literally, this means that a grant of jurisdiction,
"' Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 79.
JOSEPH STORY, DIGESTS OF THE COMMON LAW (1826), reprinted in THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OFJOSEPH STORY 406-07 (William W. Story ed., Charles C.
Little andJames Brown, Boston 1852).
' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in
Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 699, 711 (2008).
' Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 731,
761-62 (2010).
1 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1963) ("[S]ince Congress
in the Jones Act has declared that the negligence part of the claim shall be tried by a
jury, we would not be free, even if we wished, to require submission of all the claims
to the judge alone.").
'" Monaghan, supra note 148, at 761-65.
' Id. at 767-68.
5 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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unaccompanied by authority from Article I or another part of the Consti-
tution, is insufficient to confer the affirmative power to create law. Unless
there is something special about diversity jurisdiction-something that
the Court did not mention in Erie-it is hard to find a principled reason
to treat the grant of admiralty jurisdiction so differently. This point is on-
ly reinforced when one recalls that the state courts, through devices such
as the "savings to suitors" clause, have concurrent jurisdiction over many
153
maritime cases.
3. Interstate and International Cases
The last group of cases that present uniquely federal interests are the
"disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with
foreign nations."15 This area differs from both diversity and admiralty in
one important respect: here, there is a textual basis in the Constitution
and in a number of statutes that, taken together with historical develop-
ments leading up to the adoption of the Constitution, can support a con-
clusion that a federal institution may legitimately elaborate rules for the
field.
It is easy to forget in how many places the Constitution indicates that
the federal government is to be the sole seat of authority in matters of
foreign relations. They include:
Article I, § 8, cl. 3-"To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. . . ."
Article I, § 8, cl. 10-"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Na-
tions. . . ."
Article II, § 2-"The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States ....
"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors .... "
Article II, § 3-"[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers . . ."
Article III, § 2-"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made ... to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors ... to Controversies between two or more States ... and be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."
'5' 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012). That section's "savings to suitors" clause leaves
state courts with concurrent jurisdiction over most in personam maritime causes of
action. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222 (1986).
15 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
692 [Vol. 18:3
BACK TO THE BASICS OF ERIE
The developments leading up to the ratification of the Constitution
support the idea that the federal judiciary has the power to create federal
rules of decision to implement these grants of power and responsibility.
The Constitution was drafted to supplant the Articles of Confederation.
One of the Articles' key deficiencies was in the area of foreign relations.
Materials from the Constitutional Convention support the proposition
that the drafters firmly believed that coordinated control over foreign re-
lations is an essential part of the central government's responsibility. 5 5
The Federalist Papers provide additional support for the conclusion that
there is judicial authority in particular to make and develop laws that re-
late to international relations. In Federalist No. 11, Alexander Hamilton
wrote passionately about the power of the union in matters of foreign re-
lations. In Federalist No. 83, Hamilton wrote even more precisely about
the role ofjudiciary:
I feel a deep and deliberate conviction that there are many cases in
which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think it so particularly
in cases which concern the public peace with foreign nations-that
is, in most cases where the question turns wholly on the laws of na-
tions.... Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations
that require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of na-
tions; and they will sometimes be under the influence of impres-
sions which will not suffer them to pay sufficient regard to those
considerations of public policy which ought to guide their inquir-
* 157
This suggests that judges may, consistent with "considerations of
public policy," articulate rules to govern "cases which concern the public
peace with foreign nations."1 58
On the basis of this authority, the Supreme Court has developed sev-
eral important rules that govern foreign and interstate relations. Some
notable examples include the maxim that statutes should not be inter-
preted in a way that conflicts with international law, first articulated by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Murray v. The Charming Betsy;15 the treat-
ment of the Act of State doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino; 16
and the principles to which the Court turns when it exercises its jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate disputes touching on the states in their sovereign ca-
" See 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 WITH A DIARY OF THE DEBATES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION As REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 126-27, 191-92
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827).
"6 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton).
'"" THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 412-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence
Goldman ed., 2008).
5 See id.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
* 376 U.S. 398, 400 (1964).
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pacity, as it did in resolving a question about Montana's title to certain
riverbeds in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana.'
Indeed, Justice Harlan's language in Sabbatino leaves little room for
debate that international law presents a federal question, suitable for
elaboration in the federal courts in a manner very like the way that the
courts have expanded on the broad words of the Sherman Act for anti-
trust cases or the broad principles of labor law.'6 2 There is, to be sure, a
school of thought that holds that Erie consigned the rules of customary
international law to the states, 63 but the implications for the nation's for-
eign relations and international personality of that view are troubling.
And in any event, that view is hard, or maybe impossible, to reconcile
with Sabbatino, where Justice Harlan wrote:
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with
a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judi-
ciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community must be treated ex-
clusively as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the
Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when
it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. Soon thereafter, Professor Philip
C. Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, recog-
nized the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems af-
fecting international relations. He cautioned that rules of interna-
tional law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial
state interpretations. His basic rationale is equally applicable to the
act of state doctrine.'&
In short, there are a number of situations in which the Supreme
Court has shied away from the rule announced in Hanna. Even where a
case presents a substantive question (something that is not even arguably
procedural) and it is difficult to find a source of federal law-making au-
thority, the Court has chosen to apply federal common law. As I have
noted, the Court itself has selected the areas that warrant this treatment:
cases implicating the "uniquely federal interests" that surround the "obli-
gations to and rights of the United States"; suits in the admiralty and
maritime field;'"' and "interstate and international disputes implicating
... 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
16 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S.
322, 328-29 (1990) (discussing the Court's expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-67 (1986) (discussing the expansion of
federal question jurisdiction and the preemptory effect of federal labor laws).
... See, e.g., Phillip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 742 (1939); Curtis A.
Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie,
120 HARV. L. REv. 869, 884-85 (2007).
" Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted).
"5 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
" See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations."' It
is these exceptions that have posed the most difficult problems in the
post-Erie world. In some instances, it is not clear why state law cannot
serve as the default, unless or until Congress enacts appropriate legisla-
tion, and in other instances, it is hard to explain why a jurisdictional
grant supports the creation of federal common law in some fields but not
in others.
CONCLUSION
A simplified Erie doctrine would still require the first step of the tra-
ditional sorting process: the federal court (or in reverse Erie cases, the
state court) would need to decide whether the rule at issue relates to case
processing, or if it relates to primary behavior-put more traditionally, if
the rule is procedural or substantive. If it is procedural (or as Hanna put
it, "arguably" procedural), then the forum is entitled to use its own rule,
even if that rule has some impact on the ultimate outcome of the case. If
the rule is substantive, then the court must decide which body of law to
apply-federal law or state law. If there is an applicable federal statute, or
a directly applicable constitutional provision or treaty, then federal law
governs. In the absence of a federal source of law, however, Erie's default
rule should be reinstated: state law should apply. The convoluted device
of using federal law, but then turning around and saying that federal law
will borrow from state law, is not worth the complexity and should be
abandoned. The fields presently carved out for federal law on the ground
of unique federal interest should also be re-examined. Perhaps it is per-
missible for the federal courts to build a federal common law of interna-
tional relations, given the strong textual support in the Constitution for
exclusive federal rules at that level. But it is hard to justify the other areas
of unique federal interest without undermining the principle that
prompted the Court to overrule Swift v. Tyson: ajurisdictional grant is not
an invitation to create substantive rules of law.
These changes would place some pressure on Congress to legislate in
areas of federal interest that it has left alone up until now, but the long-
term gains of clarity in the system would outweigh any short-term disrup-
tions. The federal courts could then function without worrying whether
they were overstepping the boundaries of what Judge Henry Friendly
called the "new" federal common law. 68 Operating within the boundaries
of legislatively and constitutionally conferred substantive rules, they
would once again be able to strike the balance between federal law and
state law that Erie contemplated.
67 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
" See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
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